Between Forteana and Skepticism by Dentith, M. R. X.
 
http://social-epistemology.com 
ISSN: 2471-9560 
 
 
 
Between Forteana and Skepticism 
 
Matthew R. X. Dentith, Institute for Research in the Humanities, University of Bucharest  
 
–––––––––––––––––– 
 
Dentith, Matthew R. X. “Between Forteana and Skepticism: A Review of Bernard Wills’ 
Believing Weird Things.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 11 (2018): 48-52. 
 
Short url: https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-43y (provided by WordPress)  
 
 
 
 
 48 
Vol. 7, no. 11 (2018): 48-52.  
https://wp.me/p1Bfg0-43y 
Sometimes, when it is hard to review a book, it is tempting to turn in some kind of personal 
reflection, one demonstrates why the reviewer felt disconnected from the text they were 
reviewing. This review of Bernard N. Wills Believing Weird Things - which I received three 
months ago, and have spent quite a bit of time thinking about in the interim - is just such a 
review-cum-reflection, because I am not sure what this book is about, nor who its intended 
audience is. 
 
According to the blurb on the back Believing Weird Things is a response to Michael Shermer's 
Why People Believe Weird Things (Henry Holt and Company, 1997). Shermer's book is one I 
know all too well, having read and reread it when I started work on my PhD. At the time the 
book was less than ten years old, and Shermer and his cohort of Skeptics (spelt with a 'K' to 
denote that particular brand of sceptical thought popular among (largely) non-philosophers 
in the U.S.) were considered to be the first and final word on the rationality (more properly, 
the supposed irrationality) of belief in conspiracy theories.  
 
Given I was working on a dissertation on the topic, getting to grips with the arguments 
against belief in such theories seemed crucial, especially given my long and sustained interest 
in the what you might call the contra-philosophy of Skepticism, the work of Charles Fort. 
 
Times for the Fortean 
 
Fort (who Wills mentions in passing) was a cantankerous collector and publisher of strange 
and inconvenient phenomena. His Book of the Damned (Boni and Liveright, 1919) is an early 
20th Century litany of things which seemed to fall outside the systemic study of the world. 
From rains of frogs, to cities floating in the sky, Fort presented the strange and the 
wonderful, often without comment. When he did dare to theorise about the phenomena he 
cataloged, he often contradicted his previous theories in favour of new ones. Scholars of 
Fort think his lack of a system was quite deliberate: Fort's damned data was meant to be 
immune to scientific study. 
 
Fort was hardly a known figure in his day, but his work has gained fans and adherents, who 
call themselves Forteans and engage in the study of Forteana. Forteans collect and share 
damned data, from haunted physics laboratories, to falls of angel hair. Often they theorise 
about what might cause these phenomena, but they also often don't dispute other 
interpretations of the same 'damned data.'  
 
John Keel, one of the U.S.'s most famous Forteans (and who, if he did not invent the term 
'Men in Black' at least popularised their existence), had a multitude of theories about the 
origin of UFOs and monsters in the backwoods of the U.S., which he liberally sprinkled 
throughout his works. If you challenged Keel on what you thought was an inconsistency of 
thought he would brush it off (or get angry at the suggestion he was meant to consistent in 
the first place). 
 
I was a fan of Forteana without being a Fortean: I fail the Fortean test of tolerating 
competing hypotheses, preferring to stipulate terms whilst encouraging others to join my 
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side of the debate. But I love reading Forteana (it is a great source of examples for the social 
epistemologist), and thinking about alternative interpretations. So, whilst I do not think UAP 
(unexpected aerial phenomena - the new term for UFO) are creatures from another 
dimension, I do like thinking about the assumptions which drive such theories.  
 
Note here that I say 'theories' quite deliberately: any student of Forteana will quickly become 
aware that modern Forteans (contra Fort himself) are typically very systematic about their 
beliefs. It is just that often the Fortean is happy to be a systemic pluralist, happily accepting 
competing or complimentary systems as equally possible. 
 
Weird and Weirder 
 
Which brings me back to Believing Weird Things. The first section concerns beliefs people like 
Shermer might find weird but Wills argues are reasonable in the context under which they 
developed. Wills' interest here is wide, taking in astrology, fairies, and why he is not a 
Rastafarian. Along the way he contextualises those supposedly weird beliefs and shows how, 
at certain times or in certain places, they were the product of a systemic study of the world.  
 
Wills points out that a fault of Skepticism is a lack of appreciation for history: often what we 
now consider rational was once flimflam (plate tectonics), and what was systemic and 
rational (astrology) is today's quackery. As Wills writes: 
 
The Ancients do not seem to me to be thinking badly so much as thinking in an alien 
context and under different assumptions that are too basic to admit evaluation in the 
ordinary empirical sense (which is not to say they admit of no evaluation 
whatsoever). Further, there are many things in Aristotle and the Hebrew Bible which 
strike me as true even though the question of ‘testing’ them scientifically and 
‘skeptically’ is pretty much meaningless. In short, the weird beliefs I study are at 
minimum intelligible, sometimes plausible and occasionally true. [4] 
 
Indeed, the very idea which underpins Shermer's account, 'magical thinking,' seems to fail 
the skeptical test: why, like Shermer, would you think it is some hardwired function rather 
than culturally situated? But more importantly, how is magical thinking any different from 
any other kind of thinking? 
 
This last point is important because, as others have argued (including myself) many beliefs 
people think are problematic are, when looked at in context with other beliefs, either not 
particularly problematic, or no more problematic than the beliefs we assume are produced 
rationally. The Psychology of Religion back in the early 20th Century is a good example of 
this: when psychologists worried about religious belief started looking at the similarities in 
belief formation between the religious and the non-religious, they started to find the same 
kind of 'errors' in irreligious people as well.  
 
In the same respect, the work in social psychology on belief in conspiracy theories seems to 
be suffering the same kind of problem today: it's not clear that conspiracy theorists are any 
less (or more) rational than the rest of us. Rather, often what marks out the difference in 
belief are the different assumptions about how the world is, or how it works. Indeed, as 
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Wills writes: 
 
Many weird ideas are only weird from a certain assumed perspective. This is 
important because this assumed perspective is often one of epistemic and social 
privilege. We tend to associate weird ideas with weird people we look down upon 
from some place of superior social status. [10] 
 
The first section of Believing Weird Things is, then, possibly the best defence of a kind of 
Fortean philosophy one could hope for. Yet that is also an unfair judgement, because 
thinking of Believing Weird Things as a Fortean text is just my imposition: Fort is mentioned 
exactly once, and only in a footnote. I am only calling this a tentatively Fortean text because 
I am not sure who the book's audience is. Ostensibly - at least according to the blurb - it is 
meant to be a direct reply to Shermer's Why People Believe Weird Things. But if it is, then it is 
twenty years late: Why People Believe Weird Things was published in 1997.  
 
Not just that, but whilst Believing Weird Things deals with a set of interesting issues Shermer 
did not cover (yet ought to have), almost everything which makes up the reply to Why People 
Believe Weird Things is to be found in the Introduction alone. Now, I'd happily set the Introduction 
as a reading in a Critical Thinking class or elementary Epistemology class. However, I could 
not see much use in setting the book as a whole. 
 
What’s Normal Anyway? 
 
Which brings us to the second half of Believing Weird Things. Having set out why some weird 
beliefs are not that weird when thought about in context, Wills sets out his reasons for 
thinking that beliefs which aren't – in some sense – considered weird ought to be. The 
choice of topics here is interesting, covering Islamophobia, white privilege, violence and the 
proper attitude towards tolerance and toleration in our polities.  
 
But it invites the question (again) of who his intended audience is meant to be? For example, 
I also think Islamophobia, racism, and violence are deeply weird, and it worries me that 
some people still think they are sensible responses. But if Wills is setting out to persuade the 
other half of the debate, the racists, the bigots, and the fans of violence, then I do not think 
he will have much luck, as his discussions never seem to get much further than "Here are my 
reckons!"  
 
And some of those reckons really need more arguments in favour of them. 
 
For example, Wills brings out the old canard that religious beliefs and scientific beliefs are 
one and the same (presented as 'religious faith' and 'scientific faith'). Not just that, but, in 
chapter 6, he talks about the things 'discovered' by religion. These are presented as being en 
par with discoveries in the sciences. Yet aren't the things discovered by religion ('humans 
beings must suffer before they learn. ... existence is suffering' [48]) really the 'discoveries' of, 
say, philosophers working in a religious system? And aren't many of these discoveries just 
stipulations, or religious edicts?  
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This issue is compounded by Wills specification that the process of discovery for religious 
faith is hermeneutics: the interpretation of religious texts. But that invites even more 
questions: if you think the gods are responsible for both the world and certain texts in the 
world you could imagine hermeneutic inquiry to be somehow equivalent to scientific inquiry, 
but if you are either doubtful of the gods, or doubtful about the integrity of the gods' 
prophets, then there is much room to doubt there is much of a connection at all between 
'faith' in science and faith in scripture. 
 
Another example: in chapter 8, Wills states: 
 
Flat-Earthers are one thing but Birthers, say, are quite another: some ideas do not 
come from a good place and are not just absurd but pernicious. [67] 
 
Now, there is an argument to be had about the merits (or lack thereof) of the Flat Earth 
theory and the thesis Barack Obama was not born in the U.S. Some might even claim that 
the Flat Earth theory is worse, given that belief might entail thinking a lot of very disparate 
institutions, located globally, are in on a massive cover-up. The idea Barack Obama is 
secretly Kenyan has little effect on those of us outside the U.S. electoral system. 
 
None of this is to say there aren't decent arguments to be had about these topics. It is, 
instead, to say that often these positions are stipulated. As such, the audience for Believing 
Weird Things seems to be people who agree with Wills, rather than an attempt by Wills to 
change hearts and minds. 
 
How to Engage With Weird Beliefs 
 
Which is not to say that the second half of the book lacks merit; it just lacks meat. The 
chapters on Islamophobia (chapter 8) and racism (chapter 9) are good: the contextualisation 
of both Islamophobia and the nature of conflicts in the Middle East are well expressed. But 
they are not particularly novel (especially if you read the work of left-wing commentators). 
But even if the chapters are agreeable to someone of a left-wing persuasion, all too often the 
chapters just end: the chapter on violence (chapter 10), for example, has no clear conclusion 
other than that violence is bad.  
 
Similarly confused is the chapter on tolerance (chapter 11). But the worst offender is the 
chapter on the death of Conservatism (chapter 14). This could have been an interesting 
argument about the present state of today's politics. But the chapter ends abruptly, and with 
it, the book. There is no conclusion, no tying together of threads. There's hardly even any 
mention of Shermer or skepticism in the second half of Believing Weird Things. 
 
Which brings us back to the question: who is this book for? If the book were just the first 
half it could be seen as both a reply to Shermer and a hesitant stab at a Fortean philosophy. 
But the second half of the book comes across more as the author's rumination on some 
pertinent social issues of the day, and none of that content seems to advance far beyond 
'Here are my thoughts...' 
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Which, unfortunately, is also the character of this review: in trying to work out who the book 
is for I find my thoughts as inconclusive as the text itself. None of this is to say that Believing 
Weird Things is a bad or terrible book. Rather, it is just a collection of the author's 
ruminations. So, unless you happen to be a fan of Wills, there is little to this text which 
substantially advances the debate over belief in anything. 
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